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juvenile delinquency, like the criminal law, is concerned
with the correction of anti-social activity. The distinction between the
law of delinquency and the law of crimes is rationalized by the obvious
fact that the young persons, between the ages of seven and sixteen,' who
are treated as delinquents, are im*imature persons. They have arrived at
the age of moral responsibility, they can know right and wrong, they can
act with knowledge of the quality and nature of their actions. Yet they
have not that degree of understanding, that experience of life, that extent
of self-control, that stability of resolution, which are necessary bases for
adult conduct. Because of their immaturity, certain activity in juveniles
menaces society though the same activity by adults would not jeopardize
the public peace; such activity, therefore is classified among delinquent
offenses, though it is not criminal. Acts, criminal in an adult, are declared
2
delinquencies in consideration of the immaturity of the juvenile offender.
Further, the delinquency jurisdiction undertakes to adjudicate, correct
and punish juveniles by employing criteria of responsibility plus
procedures and remedies adapted to the limited perceptions and peculiar
sensibilities which characterize the immature.' Everyone concerned with
delinquency will agree that immaturity and its implications are facts basic
to a philosophy or rationale of delinquency legislation, procedure and
administration. It is submitted, however, that young people's natural
status of moral dependency upon their parents is a fact equally basic and
important in the philosophy of delinquency. This fact is not so crassly
obvious as that of immaturity, and there is good reason to believe that a
denial of it or a greater or less indifference to it characterizes the philosophy which guides many persons sincerely and actively concerned with
delinquency as a problem of our society and as a subject upon which
our legal institutions must operate.
HE LAW OF

* Priest of the Diocese of Albany; Professor of Comparative Law in the Graduate
Division of the School of Law of St. John's University.
1 N.Y.C. DOM. REL. CT. AcT §2 (15).
2 Ibid.; N.Y. CHILDREN'S CT. AcT §2 (2).
3 See People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932).
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The juvenile, considered under this aspect of moral dependency, is better named
the child. The correlative of the child's
moral dependency is the parents' moral responsibility. Taken together, these elements
of dependency
and responsibility
constitute the natural parent-child
relationship.
In the philosophy of St. Thomas
Aquinas, this relationship is a datum
of nature and has
its ultimate origin
in the creative act
WILLIAM F. CAHILL
of God. Using his
characteristic teleological approach, St.
Thomas considers the act of human generation. He examines the facts which are manifest in the nature of the act and in its natural
consequences. As creation is the act of God,
one who assumes to make himself a partner
or agent in that act acts rationally only if he
assumes the responsibilities which are its
natural consequence, and he has the rights
necessary to execute those duties. It follows
that every man and woman who voluntarily
and morally performs that act by which one
places himself in the creative chain of
causality, thereby establishes a bond of
responsibility, practically life-long, between
himself and the child, he begets. On the
other hand, nature binds the child, until
4
maturity, to the parents who begot him.
4 In the passage here quoted, St. Thomas is devel-

oping the thesis that fornication is wrongful in
natural law and that marriage is a natural institution. The conclusions stated above are intermediate premises in this argument. "Now though
the semen is superfluous for the preservation of
the individual, yet it is necessary to man for the

St. Thomas then 5 describes the integration of the parent-child relation with those
moral ties of right and duty which run
between the child and the general society
of men. The doctrine may be summarized
in four principles - the first having reference to the basic relationship, the other
three being corollaries of the first.
1. Under God's ordinance, expressed in
nature, the parents, as originators of a
child's being, have a bond with him which
is anterior to any ties which arise between
the child and other men by reason of "some
combination in external works." Of this
latter sort are the bonds of society which
propagation of the species.... The emission of the
semen then ought to be so directed as that both
the proper generation may ensue and the education of the offspring be secure. Hence it is clear
that every emission of the semen is contrary to
the good of man, which takes place in a way
whereby generation is impossible. . . . Likewise
it must be against the good of man for the semen
to be emitted under conditions which, allowing
generation to ensue, nevertheless bar the due
education of the offspring ....
A further consideration is, that in the human species the young need
not only bodily nutrition, as animals do, but also
the training of the soul. Other animals have their
natural instincts to provide for themselves; but
man lives by reason, which takes the experience of
a long time (seven years) to arrive at discretion.
Hence children need instruction by the confirmed
experience of their parents: nor are they capable
of such instruction as soon as they are born, but
after a long time, the time in fact taken to arrive
at the years of discretion. For this instruction
again a long time is needed; and moreover, because of the assaults of passion, whereby the judgment of prudence is thwarted, there is need not
of instruction only but also of repression. For this
purpose the woman by herself is not competent,
but at this point especially there is necessary the
concurrence of the man in whom is at once reason more perfect to instruct, and force more
potent to chastise." Of God and His Creatures,
SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, Bk. III, c.122 (Rickaby transl.).
5 "The father has care of the child, not only in
his relations with other men, as the king has care

3

arise out of the individual's external needs
and activities and, through these, relate
him to the men among whom he lives.
2. Immediately from this basic parentchild relationship arises the parental right
to have the child in their care. None who
is a stranger to the parent-child relation
can derive therefrom a right to have care
of the child. Only where the. parents' nonuse or misuse of this right fails to supply
the child's external -needs or govern properly his societal relations may the state, in
vindication of its competency over the
child's external concerns, give custody of
him to a person other than the parent.
3. As a societal power, the state has no
rightful power to arrange those aspects of a
child's life which are individual. concerns.
By nature, that power belongs exclusively
to the parental government. The state
and other individual .men may exercise this
power when they properly act as parentsubstitute, where the parent's.defect or abdication in exercise of his natural moral power
jeopardizes the child's external concerns.
4. Even in its government of the child
"as a member of society," in his "relations
with other men," the state exercises an
authority which is not exclusive of, but coordinate with, that of the "parental government."
of him, but also in his individual concerns, as has
been shown above of God (Chap. XCIII). And
this with good reason, for a parent is like God in
giving natural origin to a human being. Hence
divine and paternal government extend to the
individual, not merely as a member of society,
but as a person subsisting in his own nature by
himself .... Everyone has care of things according as they belong to him: for solicitude about
things that are no affair of yours is blamed as
meddlesomeness.... One man belongs to another
either by human origin and bodily descent, or by
some combination in external works." Of God
and His Creatures, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES,
Bk. III, c. 130 (Rickaby transl.).
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THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP IN THE LAW OF DELINQUENCY
The relationship itself, as distinguished
from the powers, rights and duties which
derive from it, seeks direct recognition in
the law of adoption. Yet the recognition
given to the basic relationship in the adoption law of any legal system must inevitably
be reflected in the delinquency law of that
system. Exercise of the delinquency jurisdiction must affect the parental right of
custody and the parent's authority to govern the internal and external concerns of
his child, which right and authority derive
from the natural parent-child relationship.
Further, in a system of law where adoption
and delinquency jurisdictions are statutory,
those commissioned to exercise the two
jurisdictions will more likely take a similar approach to the principles which underlie the problems presented.
In the New York adoption cases, the
legal standing of the basic parent-child
relation has been clearly established, its
origin recognized, and its practical influence pointed out. All of this is succinctly
stated in a dictum of Justice Hill:
Parents have a natural, God-given right
to the control and custody of their children.
Every experienced welfare worker could
advance a dozen or more reasons why
children should be taken from indigent
parents ... but it is still a good policy to
remember that nothing will take the place
of parental love and affection. 6
In all of the English-speaking jurisdictions, except those few in which the Civil
Law has been received, adoption is a statutory institution. All of the adoption statutes,
as far as we are aware, give at least this
degree of recognition to the natural parent6 People ex rel. Flannagan v. Riggio, 193 Misc.
930, 933, 85 N.Y.S. 2d 534, 536 (Sup. Ct, 1948).
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child relationship, that they require the
parent's consent to his child's adoption in
at least some circumstances. Some enactments, like that of New York, dispense
with parental consent only when the parent
has surrendered or abandoned the child,
or has been adjudged incompetent or guilty
of certain misconduct. 7 In other jurisdictions, particularly in the British Commonwealth, adoption laws give the courts discretion to dispense with parental* consent
in circumstances not specifically enumerated in the statutes.
Consideration should be given to recent
holdings in some of the jurisdictions last
mentioned. The effect of granting such discretion by statute is to empower their
courts to evaluate the natural parent-child
relationship as one fact or circumstance in
the complexus of an individual situation.
When taken thus, the status of the relationship is jeopardized by two hazards, as shall
appear from consideration of the cases.
An effort at "scientifically objective" adjudication, and the employment of a method
of construction .which relies excessively
upon the language of the statutes, combine
to destroy or obscure the special standing
which the natural relationship should have
in all laws affecting children.
An Australian judge explained his exercise of statutory discretion to dispense with
a natural mother's consent to the adoption
of her child:
The evidence of the psychiatrist and psychologist satisfied me that no special bond
exists which cannot exist between the child
and the permanent mother substitute,
given a suitable substitute. 8
7 N. Y. DOM. REL. LAW §111 (4).

8 Quoted by Herring, C. J., in Ax v. C-S (No. 1),

[1955] Argus L.R. 943, 953; the case is discussed
in Castles, Discretionary Powers in Adoption
Statutes, 7 RES JUDICATAE 307 (1956).

The restriction of judicial consideration to
the evidence of the expert witnesses has
interesting implications. It could be warranted only by an unexpressed finding
that all the facts bearing upon the existence
of a basis for relationship between the
mother and child were not facts of common
knowledge, but facts peculiarly within the
special knowledge of the psychiatrist and
psychologist. 9 There was on. the record
other evidence of facts pertinent to the
question, for the judge's failure to consider
this other evidence was one ground for
reversal in the appellate court.' 0 The Australian psychologists, like the New York
social workers mentioned by Justice Hill,
are disciples of special sciences, prone to
see all facts in the light of the assumptions
of their discipline, and to give little weight
to facts which are not assessable by their
special methods of investigation. This myopia of the specialist is alien to the jurist
whose science requires him to establish
facts from every area of human experience,
objective and subjective, natural and even
supernatural. Of course, the parent-child
relationship has aspects which no serious
psychiatrist, who examines the emotional
impact of anticipating and experiencing
the birth of a child, will ignore. And the.
experienced social worker will likely agree
with Justice Hill, that peculiar bonds of
affection beneficial to the child are at least
a usual concomitant of the bond of blood.
The Australian appellate court had a
second ground for reversal, expressed in
the opinion of Chief Justice Herring."
9 This inference assumes that the Australian rule
of evidence is similar to the New York rule
expressed in Dougherty v. Milliken, 163 N. Y.
527, 533, 57 N.E. 757, 759 (1900).
'0Ax v. C-S (No. 1), [1955] Argus L.R. 943, 950.
11 Ibid.

3

Prima facie, the welfare of the child is best
served by restoring the natural motherchild relationship. In the opinion of another
member of the court, the form of the applicable legislation recognized that natural ties
are most important of all, except in very
special circumstances.1

2

Clealy the remarks of Chief Justice
Herring and his associate, like the dictum
of Justice Hill, carry more than an appreciation of the special facts appearing in an
individual case. They seem to carry a
commitment to the principle that the parent-child relationship is a value in se, known
to the law through a philosophy which
searches out the ultimate truths of human
existence. Without such a commitment, in
our law and in our judges, the plan of
nature and of God for the nurture of children is demeaned to the status of special
fact, to be discovered, if at all, through the
opinion evidence of a specialist who has
examined a woman and a child under the
assumption that human nature has no common design and no common Cause.
In the adjudication of the English and
Australian adoption laws, the parent-child
relationship has been subjected also to the
hazards of statutory language. The Australian High Court 1 3 has construed the New
South Wales statute which, at least in this
particular, is very similar to its Victorian
counterpart applied in the case just discussed. Power is given to dispense with
parental consent "where, having regard to
the circumstances, the court deems it just
and reasonable to do so."'1

4

The High Court

held that this discretion was not abused
where considerations of the disappointment
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of foster parents and of their ability to give
the child superior advantages outweighed
the right of the parent to withhold consent
15

to adoption.

The English Adoption Act of 1950 empowers the court to dispense with consent
if it is satisfied that the parent's "consent
is unreasonably withheld."' 6 The provision
is lucidly construed by Mr. Justice Devlin
in a concurring opinion given in the Queen's
Bench Division.
In my judgment, the test to be applied for
the purpose of s. 3 (1) (c) [of the 1950

Act] is this: Is the attitude of a father, in
refusing his consent, unreasonable, i.e:, is
the father being unreasonable as a father?
...The welfare of the child is, of course,
of indirect importance, because a father
who had no regard for the welfare of his
child in reaching such decision is not
reasonable ....

17

But the Justice seems not to conceive
that the courts must recognize the parentchild relation as a value in se. Rather, to
him, it is a consideration having just that
weight which the statute gives to it. He contrasts the provision applied in the case in
which he is writing with the parallel clause
of the Adoption of Children Act of 1926.
There it was enacted that the court could
dispense with a parent's consent if he were
"a person whose consent ought, in the
opinion of the court. .. in all the circum-

stances of the case, to be dispensed with."' 8
And he declares:
That proviso gave an absolute discretion
to the court, and, in exercising their powers
15Mace v. Murray, [1955] Argus L.R. 292,
298-300.
1

6ADOPTION

ACT, 1950, §3 (1) (c).

12 Id. at 976.

17 Hitchcock v. W. B., [1952] 2 All E. R. 119,

13 Mace v. Murray, [1955] Argus L.R. 292.

123 (Q.B.).

14

N.S.W.

CHILD WELFARE ACT,

1939, §167 (d).

18 ADOPTION OF CHILDREN ACT,

1926, §2 (3).
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under a section so worded, the justices
would, no doubt, be right in regarding the
welfare of the child as the matter of paramount importance.' 9

on behalf of the child's real and permanent
interests. 22 Judge Desmond declares the
state of our law:

The juvenile delinquency jurisdiction is
rarely called upon to terminate the legal
status of parent and child, and it does not,
therefore, directly confront the basic natural relationship as the adoption jurisdiction does. Yet the appreciation of that
relationship's inherent dignity and value,
and the commitment to maintain its dignity
in the law, must be influential in those
cases where a children's court deals with

No court can, for any but the gravest

reasons, transfer a child from its natural
parents to any other person [citations
omitted], since the right of a parent, under
natural law, to establish a home and bring

up children is a fundamental one, and
beyond the reach of any court. [citing the
U. S. Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska]
... It is significant that the several counsel

who have filed briefs on this appeal have
found no reported New York case where,
for any reason, a small child has been
ordered delivered from the custody of a
decent parent in a decent home into the

the parental rights deriving from that relationship.
THE PARENTAL RIGHT OF CHILD
CUSTODY
Custody is the right to have actual care
of the child in his individual and social
concerns. It is an immediate corollary of
the natural parent-child relationship. The
authority of the sovereign to intervene in
the custody of children has been justified
as a consequence of his duty to protect
helpless persons found within his dominions. 20 Its exercise for the purpose of depriving the parent of custody has always
required a finding that the parent is unable
or unwilling to execute his duties in the
child's regard. 21 Our American courts early
held that the parents' primal right of custody is subject to intervention by the courts
19 Ibid.
20 Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 431, 148 N.E.
624, 626 (1925).
21 See United States v. Green, 26 Fed. Cas. 30,
No. 15256 (C.C.D. R.I. 1824); Butler v. Freeman, Amb. 302, 27 Eng. Rep. 204 (Ch. 1756);
The King v. DeManneville, 5 East. 221, 223, 102
Eng. Rep. 1054, 1055 (K. B. 1804); De Manneville v. De Manneville, 10 Ves. Jun. 52, 32 Eng.
Rep. 762 (Ch. 1804).

hands of others.

23

The jurisdiction of the Children's Courts
of New York in custody matters is limited,
and, to the extent it is granted, is concurrent with the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, 24 which enjoys the full parens patriae
power. 25 By limitations imposed in the

statutes, 26 the Children's Court custodyjurisdiction respects only neglected, abandoned, or delinquent children, 27 and trans22

See United States v. Green, supra note 21; Wil-

cox v. Wilcox, 14 N.Y. 575, 578 (1856); Matter
of Waldron, 13 Johns. R. 418, 421 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1816).
People ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser,
539, 542, 104 N.E. 2d 895, 897 (1952).
Serby's Adoption, 2 A.D. 2d 988, 157
892 (2d Dep't 1956); In re Knapp, 156
668, 671 (Surr. Ct. 1956).
23

303 N.Y.
See In re
N.Y.S. 2d
N.Y.S. 2d

New York, the Supreme Court is the highest
trial court and, in addition, has a limited appellate
jurisdiction.
2-4 In

MacLaren v. Kincaid, 283 App. Div. 817, 128
N.Y.S. 2d 793 (2d Dep't 1954).
25

26 N. Y. CHILDREN'S CT. ACT §§6(8), 20, 22 (b),
(e), 30-a (7).
Walsh v. Walsh, 146 Misc. 604, 263 N. Y. Supp.
517 (Child. Ct. 1933).

27

3
fers of custody made by this jurisdiction
must be temporary. 2 s In some circumstances
relatives must be preferred as custodians.
In any case, the religious faith of the child
must be protected, as the New York Con-,
stitution 29 provides.

The Children's Court Acts do not explicitly advert to the natural character and
legal pre-eminence of the parent's right to
have custody of his child. There is no published information from which one can
adequately estimate the extent to which
considerations of the parents' natural right
may influence the judgments of the Children's Courts or their other dealings with
delinquent children.
One can only hope that the need does
not often arise for the Appellate Division
to correct a Children's Court judgment
upon the grounds that the parental right of
custody was unwarrantedly invaded. In one
.case, however, a thirteen-year-old delinquent boy had been committed to a reformatory. The Appellate Division said,
. . . [W]e feel that the rehabilitation of

this boy will be better served under parental guidance than under institutional
care. Concededly, the boy comes from a
good home and has intelligent and respected
parents who are deeply concerned about
his welfare. Because of the extreme youth
of the offender and the conceded good
home environment, we think both the boy
and his parents are entitled to one more opportunity for his natural development....30
In re Caposella, 255 App. Div. 987, 8 N.Y.S. 2d
509 (2d Dep't 1938); In re Stanton, 119 N.Y.S. 2d
868 (Child. Ct. 1952).
29 N. Y. CONST. art. VI, §18.
30

ln re Anonymous, 281 App. Div. 1061, 121
N.Y.S. 2d 281 (3d Dep't 1953).
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OF
GOVERNMENT
PARENTAL
CHILD'S INDIVIDUAL CONCERNS
The parent's exclusive right to govern
one of his child's individual concerns, the
child's religious formation and practice, has
been clearly recognized in our constitutional law. This right of the parent has been
held to be an aspect of the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and
has been repeatedly vindicated against interference from the education laws of the
states.3 1 That same right, vis-a-vis the
states' laws governing the activity of children in public places and in employment,
has been given a less complete scope. 32 In
determining the content and method of his
child's education in secular learning, the
parent's right of control is paramount, except to the extent that state regulations
properly exercise the authority of civil government to require instruction truly necessary to equip the child for his duties as a
33
citizen.
The constitutional and statutory requirements,3 4 that the New York Children's
"The child is not the mere creature of the state;
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations."
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925) ("The Oregon School Case"). See Zorach
v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 100 N.E. 2d 463, afl'd,
343 U.S. 306 (1952) (released time); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943), overruling, Minersville School Dist. v.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (flag salute).
32 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1943).
31

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
See Matter of Weberman, 198 Misc. 1055, 100
N.Y.S. 2d 60 (Sup. Ct. 1950); State v. Hoyt, 84
N.H. 38, 146 Atl. 170 (1929). See also Chamberlain, The Legislature and the Schools, 11 A.B.A.J.
492 (1925).
34 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §18; N.Y. CHILDREN'S CT.
ACT §§6 (8), 20, 22 (b), (e), 30-a (7); N. Y. C.
DOM. REL. CT. ACT §§25, 32, 61(6), 83, 86(3), 88.
33

28
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Courts shall protect the religious faith of
children whom they place in the care of
others than their parents, do not advert to
the parent's right to determine the form of
his child's religious training. Nor is the
parental right to control the child's secular
education distinctly recognized in the acts
which create and regulate the delinquency
jurisdiction.
New Jersey, on the other hand, does not
protect by statute or by constitutional mandate the religion of children w)vose custody
is in the hands of the courts. A recent decision of the Appellate Dvision of New Jersey's Superior Court, 3 while it arrives at
the same result as might be reached under
the New York statute, does so by a rather
unclear process of balancing interests. The
court held that a child's religious training is
one of the elements of "gradational significance" which may be considered in promoting the general welfare of the infant.
The court gave no weight to the wishes of
either parent, both having been found unfit
for custody. Nor does the court indicate
whether the act of the mother who had had
the child baptized and instructed in the
religion of the father, but who now wants
the child to have no religious formation,
influenced its decision. The court did consider the twelve-year-old girl's expressed
preference for the father's religion, and
gave her into the custody of a social agency
of that faith. The direction of the court
below, that the agency must place the child
in a devout home of that religion, was overruled by the appellate court. The reasoning
here was that the courts have no compe3

Scanlon v. Scanlon, 29 N.J. Super. 317, 102 A.

2d 656 (App. Div. 1954). The New York revisions in analogous cases are discussed in Recent
Decision, Religion and Child Custody, 3 CATHOLIC LAWYER 177 (April 1957).

tency to evaluate one religion against another or to judge the quality of religious
devotion in any home. While the decision
leaves the religious agency free to select for
the girl, a home which it believes to be
devout in its religious practice, the rationale
expressed in condemning the lower court's
direction, and the designation of religious
formation as one of the elements of "gradat~onal significance" leave doubt whether the
court might not ignore the religious training
of a child in slightly different circumstances.
In a broad area oC the child's individual
concerns, his health and temporal welfare,
the parental right of governance is subject
to being overridden by the judgment of the
courts. Where a health measure imposed by
law affects the health of ie general public,
the attitude of the United States Supreme
Court is clearly to uphold the legal regulation. 3

No case in which medical treatment

was ordered for the sake of the health of an
individual child has been reviewed by the
Supreme Court.3 7 But the cases where such
orders were involved have been nearly uniformly decided against the objecting par38
ents by the higher courts of the states.
Orders of the inferior courts have sometimes been overruled where the prognosis
39
of success in the treatment was uncertain
and where the order was issued before
36 Jacobson
(1904).

v. Massachusetts, 197

U.S. 11

618, 104 N.E. 2d
People v. Labrenz, 411 Ill.
769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952).
'47

38 See,

e.g., People v. Labrenz, supra note 37;
Morrison v. State, 252 S.W. 2d 97 (Mo. App.
1952);'Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W. 2d 812 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1947); Matter of Vasko, 238 App. Div.
128, 263 N.Y. Supp. 552 (2d Dep't 1933).
39

Matter of Tuttendario, 21 Pa. Dist. Rep. 561

(1911), discussed in Note, 41 GEO.L. J.226, 235

(1953).

3
parents had been found unfit and deprived
40
.of custody.
Our Children's Courts have jurisdiction
41

to make orders of this kind,

and the

parents' right to object has very little statutory recognition. 42 Where the pathology is
physical or acutely mental, the diagnosis of
the court-appointed physicians is likely to
be objective and the treatment will seldom
trespass upon the parents' government -of
the child's personal life. An exceptional
situation would be one in which the morally
outrageous doctrine of Buck v. Bell4" might
be applied by court order in the case of a
child.
On the other hand, where there are psychological complications in a physical defect or in its treatment, 44 and especially
40 Matter of Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P. 2d

765 (1942).
A handicapped child, though not neglected or
delinquent, is within the jurisdiction of the
Children's Court. N.Y. CHILDREN'S CT. ACT §§2
(7), 6 (1) (e). Any person who knows a child to
be within the court's jurisdiction may initiate a
petition. Id. §10. Public health officers have the
duty to enforce the PUBLIC HEALTH LAW which
declares the state policy to provide rehabilitation
services for handicapped children. N. Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW §§324 (1) (e), 2580.
42 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §2583 (d) exempts
from the mandates of sections 2580-83 (medical care of the handicapped) a child whose
parents object because they rely exclusively for
healing on the practice of the religious tenets of a
church. This seems a much narrower protection
than that afforded by N.Y. EDuc. LAW §3204
(5), which permits a child to be excused from
health classes in the schools if the instruction
conflicts with the religion of the child or his
parent.
43 274 U.S. 200 (1927). The Court upheld application of the Virginia sterilization statute in the
case of a feebleminded eighteen-year-old unmarried mother.
44 See, e.g., Matter of Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127
N.E. 2d 820 (1955); Matter of Rotkowitz, 175
Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 624 (Child. Ct. 1941).
41
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where the case is one presenting mental
pathology of the lighter sort, 45 a court order

may trespass unwarrantedly upon the area
of the child's life which is properly reserved
to parental governance. There appear to be
psychological overtones in many delinquency cases. 46 Therefore, care should be
taken that the parent's rights be safeguarded
in ordering psychological services for the
delinquent child. Most important of the
parents' rights in this regard is the right to
instill in their children standards of conduct. We are not here concerned with evaluations of the conduct which has raised
the issue of the child's delinquency - usually there is no difference between the
values of the parent and those of the court
officials in respect of such conduct. Rather,
the problem here is that which arises when
a psychiatrist or other officer of the court,
in attempting to correct some psychological
difficulty or to resolve a mental conflict in
the child, declares or intimates to the child
that standards of right and wrong, governing his "individual concerns" and seriously
proposed to him by his parents, are erron47
eous.
See, e.g., Matter of Carstairs, 115 N.Y.S. 2d
314 (Child. Ct. 1952).
46 In the year 1956, when 8237 delinquency cases
were disposed of after investigation by the Probation Bureau of the Children's Court Division of
the Domestic Relations Court of the City of New
York, 1499 allegedly delinquent children were
interviewed or examined by the diagnostic service
of the Bureau of Mental Health Services attached
45

to the same court.
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47 On the responsibilities -of the psychotherapist in
matters where his patient's conscience is involved,
see the Allocution of His Holiness, Pope Pius XII,
April 9, 1953, 45 ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIs 275,
284 (1953), English translation, 25 CATHOLIC AcTION 17, 19 (June 1953).
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PARENTAL AND PUBLIC GOVERNMENT OF THE CHILD'S SOCIAL
CONCERNS
The child in his "relations with other
men" is the proper subject of the law of
delinquency. The determination of the New
York Appellate Division, in the case from
which we quoted when discussing the
parental right of custody, 48 illustrates clearly
the true notion of the coordinate jurisdiction of parent and state in this aspect of
the child's life.
Judgment modified by directing that the
infant delinquent be placed in the custody
of his parents for the purpose of control
and rehabilitation, subject to such probationary direction as the Children's Court
may impose. ... 49
Of a very large group of children handled by the Probation Bureau of the
Children's Division of the New York City
Domestic Relations Court in 1956, about
60% were placed on probation, 14%
were sent to institutions, and 26.% were
given discharges or suspended sentences.50
From the bare statistics, it is not possible
to know whether and to what extent the
court recognized, encouraged, or solicited
parental participation in the correction and
guidance of the 4500 delinquents who
were returned to the homes from which
they came. Nor are we instructed by the
few Children's Court cases which reach the
published reports. It is notorious that delinquency cases are seldom appealed, and
this fact does not necessarily postulate
complete satisfaction of the parents with
the decisions of the courts. Many families
48In re Anonymous, 281 App. Div. 1061, 121

N.Y.S. 2d 281 (3d Dep't 1953).
49

Ibid.

50 ANNUAL REPORT

pt. II, 18.

of delinquent children are poor or have an
overwhelming sense of awe before the officers of the courts. The proceedings are
usually so discreet that the family's good
name is not prejudiced, and in most cases
the child is soon back in the home, if, indeed, he does not live at home throughout
the proceeding. Even if he is sent away,
the family can easily "cover up" by saying
he is visiting with relatives. There are not,
therefore, the incentives of monetary gain
or the avoidance of financial loss which
make the expense of counsel to appeal a
worthwhile investment in civil cases. Nor is
the jeopardy so severe as in criminal cases,
where appeals are frequent enough. The
law of delinquency should not be, for these
causes, deprived of the benefit of appellate
guidance. Nor should the public be kept in
ignorance of the application of this branch
of the law - of course, that is not to say
that the delinquent child should be deprived
of the privacy with which the courts protect him. Pertinent here is the complaint
made by Justice Follett in behalf of the
rights of civil litigants and of the appellate
courts' duties. The words may be repeated
in behalf of citizens who feel a responsibility to know the law of delinquency: "It is
of little use to decide issues of fact or of
law unless it be disclosed how they are
decided."51
A number of delinquency studies indicate the validity of the conclusion stated by
the Legislative Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
. ..in many cases where delinquency may
be traced to the home, the fault of the
parents does not lie in evil intent or indifference but rather in the fact that the
51 Shaffer v. Martin, 20 App. Div. 304, 46 N.Y.
Supp. 992 (4th Dep't 1897).

3
parents do not have the mental capacity,
comprehension or moral resources necessary to cope with the problem of guiding
52
their children.
Obviously, the cooperative correctional
governance of the delinquent by court and
parents has little or no application in such
cases. The court is left to its own resources,
and does-no injury to parents who are incapable of understanding or of assuming
their responsibilities.
But we know almost nothing of the principles which actually guide the court in its
dealings with "intelligent and respectable
parents who are deeply concerned about
their children's welfare."
Nor do we know how the courts operate
when the parents are contributing to delinquency by "evil intent or indifference." Perhaps they are deprived of custody, but that
fact does not appear from the court reports
or from the independent studies. Perhaps
deprivation of custody is not a proper procedure in such cases. Perhaps the courts
proceed to correct the children of these
parents by pursuing a course which ignores
the evil or indifferent parent- if so, the
procedure seems indefensible. It would be
good to know what efforts are made to turn
the evil parents from their path and to put
a path under the feet of the indifferent. Certainly these efforts rarely involve punishment of the parent. For in the Children's
Courts of this city, the ratio of "adult proceedings" to juvenile delinquency cases,
during the years 1955 and 1956, has been
53
less than 2 per 1,000.
52 BULLETIN OF THE COMMITTEE ON STATE LEGISLATION, ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF

NEW YORK 433, 436 (1956) (hereinafter cited as
BULLETIN).
53

The actual figures are given in ANNUAL REPORT

pt. II, 18.

CATHOLIC LAWYER, JULY

1957

The Report of the Bar Association Committee 54 is fairly representative of criticism
leveled against a proposal made by the
New York State Temporary Commission
on Youth and Delinquency to the Legislature of 1956. 5, The recommended legislation had two purposes, to bring before
the Children's Court the parents of every
child found delinquent, and to better enable
the Court to direct the conduct of parents
found to have contributed to the delinquency of their children. The Temporary
Commission and other groups and individuals urged the proposal as a more effective
means of enlisting the cooperation of the
evil and indifferent parent in effecting his
child's rehabilitation; they believed that
some considerable proportion of the parents of delinquents are of the class contemplated. The opposition to both phases of
the proposal was largely premised upon the
conclusions expressed in the Bar Association Committee Report, that the enactment
was unnecessary, inefficacious and possibly
destructive of the "disturbed parent-child
relationship. 5'

6

Much of the opposition

decried any measure involving a threat of
punishment to delinquent parents.
The first phase of the proposal, to require the courts to summon the parents of
any child whose delinquency is in issue,
seems an elementary and almost indispensable step toward effecting cooperation between the court and the indifferent and
ill-disposed parent. Yet this phase was eliminated before enactment. The second phase
of the proposal was enacted with the provision for review which, it is said, has made
54 BULLETIN
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application of the new sub-section impracticable. As far as can be learned, no order
authorized by the enactment has been made
in the ten months that have passed since its
effective date, July 1, 1956.
The enactment 57 empowers the court to
issue a written order specifying conduct to
be followed by a parent who has contributed to his child's delinquency. The conduct specified shall be such as would
reasonably prevent delinquency. The order
may be reviewed immediately in County
Court, General Sessions or Supreme Court.
Willful violation of the order is a criminal
contempt, triable before a judge other than
the one who issued the order, and punishable by maximum penalties of thirty days
in county jail or $250 fine.
It is noteworthy that the enactment does
not, as do statutes making parents.liable in
tort for their children's acts, permit punishment of the parent for any act of his child.
The parent is to be punished only for his
own willful violation of a specific written
order. The order's specificity and reasonableness may be reviewed by the normal
procedures after the parent is alleged to
have violated it, in addition to the extraordinary provision for immediate review
. which seems quite unnecessary and which
has offered a good excuse for not making
the orders.
CONCLUSION
The law, in enactment and in decision,
must incorporate some absolute principle,
if the principle be only the quantitative
absolute that the greatest number of demands shall be satisfied. The law of delin57 N.Y. CHILDREN'S CT. ACT §22
DOM. R.EL. CT. ACT §83 (i).

(h); N.Y.C.

quency must choose to follow that rule or
to apply some standard of "the greatest
good." Any qualitative criterion, and one
invoking "the greatest good" is always such,
is an absolute.
Our legal tradition asserts the rights and
duties of parents as God-given and anterior
to the demands of society. Our common
law regards those rights and duties as determinable by reasoned inference upon the
data of common observation of human
nature in function. In the law of delinquency, societal interests, the welfare of
the community and the welfare of the child
in his external concerns, confront the natural law principles on the parental relation
and the parental rights to have custody and
government of the child. A delinquency law
which would ignore the interests founded
in nature, or subordinate these to the societal interests, would violate a traditional
absolute which is still vital in our constitutional law and in our common law of
domestic relations.
Statutory and decisional trends in some
jurisdictions, new problems appearing in
or suggested by decisions in New York
Children's Courts, the dubious reception
accorded a recent effort to make parental
responsibility clearer in the New York
statutes - all suggest the need of more
closely examining the statutes and policies
governing our law of juvenile delinquency.
A prime requisite of such examination is a
much more complete reporting of cases
than is presently available. The end result
of this inquiry should be a determination
of the effectiveness of our law in coordinately maintaining the societal and the parental interests affected by the delinquency
of children.
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